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We were young, and we had no need for prophecies.  
Just living was itself an act of prophecy. 
 





From penciled words spring lighthouses, castles and sheep, signs warning of 
clogwyni peryglus—dangerous cliffs—ferries from Ireland, sacred wells, Roman 
ramparts, ancient swells and angular crags, burial rings, salty gusts and circling 
birds… and the distant mountains of Snowdonia like an avalanche on the horizon. 
 I wrote:  
 
I came across a farmer fixing a kissing gate at one point. This was on a path 
not ten feet from a cliff into the sea. “Trying to get this gate to close is all,” 
he said. “I had a spring, but it rusted. No spot for metal here.”  
 
I remember this farmer, with his wrinkled Welsh smile, and I remember 
remembering this farmer as I wrote those words late at night on Easter 2013, in my 
guest room after a long day of walking. And I remember premembering my present 
self, for whom I was writing, reading these words in some far off future which is 
now (or, more precisely, was). 
 This futurepresentpast unfolds in my reading of a small, brown notebook. 
The notebook is softcover, three inches by five and not a quarter-inch thick, and 
inside it are written such banal observations as: “It was still 2hrs before my bus, so 
I went to a restaurant”; and “I sat listening to accents and thinking about things like 
denim vests”; and “I had 2 of the 4 peppers and had 3 eggs.” And yet what emerges 
in reading is not at all banal. Images bubble up with phrases and thoughts, things I 
didn’t or couldn’t record in the form of pencil scratches years ago. So the words I 
wrote are not merely words, but triggers—for memories—reconstructed, 
preconstructed, deconstructed. This is remarkable, and I’m afraid we rarely, if ever, 





Time is one of our great preoccupations. From the busy person, who struggles 
against it, to the philosopher, who struggles to understand it, to the physicist, who 
struggles to explain it. In my view, the discourse on time, which has spanned 
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millennia and methodologies, has attempted to explain time from two points of 
departure: the physical and the experiential.  
 The physical view of time has been the predominant view for most of 
modernity (Lindley, 2015). The physical theories see time as that which is 
measured by the clock and calendar and is necessary for the scheduling of 
appointments and the routing of trains. Physical time is the physicist’s time: one-
dimensional, conceptually inextricable from space and pointing like an arrow 
toward entropy (Hawking, 1988). It can be understood as a series of fleeting nows; 
the nows that were are called the past, the now that is is called the present, and the 
nows to come are called the future. This conception of time impinges on the way 
that we, as beings in society, see the world—the reason we, as Stephen Hawking 
says, “remember the past but not the future” (1988, p. 145).  
 Some have argued that the physical view of time does not fully capture the 
complexities of the concept. A purely physical description of time cannot explain, 
for example, how a person’s childhood may feel at once “like yesterday” and “like 
forever ago,” or how a fifty-minute lecture may seem to fly by on a Monday but 
crawl on a Friday. This was Henri Bergson’s (1889/2001) point in lambasting the 
definition of time as “what a clock measures.” Using human experience as his point 
of departure, Bergson sought to develop a theory of time that was non-homogenous. 
Though Bergson’s theory was seen as iconoclastic, and boggling, by some of his 
contemporaries (as chronicled by Canales, 2015), Bergson’s time was still 
essentially one-dimensional and, for that reason, deemed insufficient by those who 
sought a truly experiential view of time. 
 The time we experience, after all, does not march along in such a 
straightforward manner. As we experience the present in everyday life, memories 
from the past seem to dance with predictions of the future. We even modify these 
memories in recalling them, effectively modifying our pasts. (Was the Welshman 
really smiling?) This being the case, it would seem that the clock and calendar have 
nothing useful to say about experienced time. On the contrary, they are the reason 
that explorations of experienced time can be so jarring. Wisława Szymborska 
(2015, p. 71) wrote beautifully of this sensation in a poem called “Travel Elegy”:  
 
I won’t retain one blade of grass  
as it’s truly seen.  
 
 
Salutation and farewell  
in a single glance.  
 
For surplus and absence alike,  
a single motion of the neck. 
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 An account of this sort of experienced time was attempted by Edmund 
Husserl, who argued that time is the basis of consciousness. Husserl’s theory of 
time-consciousness, as he called it, proposed that “the past and future are integrated 
into the present of experience” (Keller, 1999, p. 64). These time-unified 
experiences are also fused into a singular, inner experience of selfhood which is 
disconnected from the outside world—what Husserl called the “transcendental 
self.” Thus, through the integration of the tenses and the transcendence of selfhood, 
individuals have a tenseless existence (Keller, 1999).  
 Husserl’s student Martin Heidegger responded to this theory with 
revisionist admiration. First, Heidegger argued that lived experience only has 
meaning in the context of the outside world—the two cannot be disconnected. 
Moreover, Heidegger argued that Husserl’s view of time as a unity implies that 
time exists as an entity; in this way, Husserl’s theory suffered the same limitation 
as theories of physical time, for which time is an entity that can be measured by 
tools like clocks (Keller, 1999). Instead, Heidegger saw time as a verb.  
 For Heidegger, time unfolds in being. This theory of time was articulated in 
Being and Time (Heidegger, 1927/2010). Heidegger’s primary purpose in this book 
was to develop a description of the way of being of human beings as an approach 
to the study of being in general. Heidegger argued that humans are fundamentally 
in the world—indeed, to be human, one must “always already” be in the world.  
This already-in-world status forms our humanness. In being human, we are 
preoccupied by the present but also oriented toward the future. In this way, past, 
present and future are united in our being; Heidegger calls this unification being-
ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-a-world (2010, p. 185). This fusion of past, 
present and future echoes the non-sequential time-consciousness of Husserl, but 
Heidegger seems to shed more light on how these three tenses actually coalesce and 
function in concert. The past, present and future are not simultaneous, but they co-
exist and can co-determine each other (Keller, 1999). In being present, the past and 
future interact: Our present-preoccupation reflects the interpretation of the self as 
defined by the past; our past-definition reflects the entanglement with the 
environment as directed toward the future; and our future-direction reflects 
acquaintance with possibility.  
In later writings, Heidegger demonstrated that this account of time 
described not only the temporality of human beings, but of nature more widely—
that is, of being in general (Capobianco, 2014, pp. 33–34). In the essay “Time and 
Being” (1969/1972), Heidegger frames time as four-dimensional: (1) the present, 
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III.  
 
For all the academic discourse on the subject of time and on the subject of 
documents, the two only coincide in a surprisingly small number of investigations. 
There is much to be said about documents and time, however: From the physical 
point of view, documents occupy space, and space is time; from the experiential 
point of view, documents exist, and existence is time.  
 Just as the physical view of time has predominated in general, so too has it 
predominated in discussions of documents—borne out, for instance, in the 
apotheosis of Unix time. The dominance of physical time in the document literature 
reflects the overarching research interests of information studies in general, whose 
foci include organization, retrieval, measurement and seeking (Bawden & 
Robinson, 2012). Time, of the physical sort, has found significant application in 
information retrieval, where researchers have, for instance, developed methods for 
processing temporal expressions in search queries (Berberich, Bedathur, Alonso, & 
Weikum, 2010), extracting temporal expressions from document content 
(Kanhabua & Nørvåg, 2008), and storing documents for long-term preservation and 
access (Song, 2010). Physical time also underlies discussions of the evolution of 
information and documents, in terms of both macroscopic, humanity-level 
evolution (Bates, 2006) and the historical trajectory of single documents within 
sociotechnical systems (Olsen, Lund, Ellingsen, & Hartvigsen, 2012). To this end, 
the notion of “document life cycle” has been adopted in business knowledge 
management (e.g., Microsoft, n.d.), but is rarely mentioned in academic research. 
 A head-on and commendably robust approach to modeling the complexities 
of documents and time came from Jean–Paul Metzger and Geneviève Lallich–
Boidin (2004). Aspiring toward universality, the authors presented a framework 
consisting of three universes: the documentary universe, which includes the 
material aspects of documents; the social universe, which includes authors and 
readers as they create and use documents; and the discursive universe, which 
features commentary on documents. Each of these universes, the authors argue, 
includes a time element. Documentary time includes the appearance, destruction 
and modification of documents, as well as the “succession of chapters, paragraphs 
and words in a text” (p. 17, translation mine), recognizing the temporal aspects of 
the reader’s interpretation as part of documentary time. Social time is the time in 
which society takes place, constituted by calendar dates, historical periods and life 
stages. Discursive time, lastly, arises from the relationships between documents and 
people which play out in a sequential order. After spelling out these three universes 
and their respective times, the authors go on to identify a complex set of linkages 
among the three universes, the complexity of which is exacerbated when it comes 
to digital documents, finally concluding that, “At present, we are unable to go 
further in clarifying the links among the three times. Could general laws really 
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exist? Are we not dealing with as many links as there are documents?” (p. 19). This 
impasse might have been predicted by Bruno Latour, whose work constitutes, in 
Frohmann’s (2007) words, a “long campaign against the separation of material, 
discursive and social realms” (p. 32). Latour instead favors a view of the social not 
as a thing, but rather—recalling Heidegger’s view of time—as an unfolding 
(Latour, 2007). I might also attribute some of the limitations of their model to their 
appropriation of an essentially physical (if a tinge Bergsonian) view of time—that 
is, as a progression of instants.  
 This discussion begs the question of whether experiential time could be used 
in the study of documents and time in order to overcome the limitations of physical 
time, just as limitations in conceptualizations of time in general were overcome 
through an experience-based approach (Heidegger, 1972, 2010). The question of 
how changes in technology coincide with changes in how we experience time has 
already emerged in academic discourse (Day, 2014; Lindley, 2015), and documents 
manifestly have a technological component (Lund, 2009).   
To operationalize an experiential view of time in the study of documents 
would necessitate studying information in use. This is a scantly researched area, 
perhaps because of the complexities involved in its very conceptualization (Kari, 
2007). Moreover, Raya Fidel (2012) identifies the highly contextualized nature of 
any findings in studies of information use as a barrier, as such context-boundedness 
prevents generalization, which is a value for many researchers.  
 Despite these challenges, more and more researchers are exploring 
information in use (Case & O’Connor, 2016). One thread of this research concerns 
people’s in-the-moment engagement with information—what Jarkko Kari (2007) 
calls “engagement with information-as-thing”—which has yielded two budding 
research areas: information experience and document experience. Information 
experience is understood as “complex, multidimensional engagement with 
information” (Bruce, Davis, Hughes, Partridge, & Stoodley, 2014, p. 4), with a 
focus on 
 
the way in which [people] engage with information and their lived worlds 
as they go about their daily life and work … encompassing the many 
nuances of that experience within different cultures, communities and 
contexts. (Bruce et al., 2014, p. 6) 
 
Bruce et al. identify information experience as both a research domain and a 
research object; as a research domain, it offers a broad view of the experience of 
human engagement with information; as a research object, an information 
experience is a discrete instance of engaging with particular information (e.g., a 
document). Particularly as a research object, information experience has only begun 
to be explored. Of note for the discussion at hand is research in the area of document 
5
Gorichanaz: Documents and Time
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2016
experience (document, in my view, constitutes a particular conglomeration of 
information). 
 K. F. Latham (2014) introduced the notion of document experience, 
drawing principles from phenomenology, pragmatism and reader-response theory 
to offer a methodology for describing and interpreting human experiences with 
documents. This methodology is centered around the concept of document 
transaction, which positions the document as the momentary coming-together of a 
person and an object. A document transaction is the mechanism by which a 
document comes to be. The document is neither the object nor the person, but 
something that arises when the two meet (Wood & Latham, 2014). The transaction, 
and thus the document, constitutes “its own thing, a moment that can only exist by 
the fusion of the person at that moment with the object in that place” (Latham, 2014, 
p. 549). Building on this, Daniel Carter (2016) called for a broader view of 
document experience that considers how a document’s infrastructural context 
impinges on an individual’s experience of that document. As researchers continue 
to develop an understanding of document experience, it may prove useful to 
incorporate an experiential theory of time into that understanding. In a way, 
Johanna Drucker has called for just such an account of documental time, with direct 
applications in humanities research:  
 
Humanists deal with the representation of temporality of documents (when 
they were created) [and] in documents (narrated, represented, depicted 
temporality), the construction of temporality across documents (the 
temporality of historical events), and also the shape of temporality that 
emerges from documentary evidence (the shape of an era, a season, a period, 
or epoch). They need a way to graph and chart temporality in an approach 
that suits the basic principles of interpretative knowledge. 
 Conceptions of temporality in humanities documents do not 
conform to those used in the social and empirical sciences. In empirical 
sciences, time is understood as continuous, uni-directional, and 
homogenous. Its metrics are standardized, its direction is irreversible, and 
it has no breaks, folds, holes, wrinkles or reworkings. But in the humanities 
time is frequently understood and represented as discontinuous, multi-
directional, and variable. Temporal dimensions of humanities artifacts are 
often expressed in relational terms: before such and such happened, or after 
a significant event. Retrospection and anticipation factor heavily in 
humanistic works, and the models of temporality that arise from historical 
and literary documents include multiple viewpoints. Anticipation, 
foreshadowing, flashbacks, and other asynchronous segments are a regular 
part of narratives, and they create alternative branchings, prospective and 
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retrospective approaches to the understanding of events that cannot be 





In effort to establish a theory of documental time that satisfies the needs of 
information-in-use and humanities researchers, the theory of document transaction 
can be revisited through the lens of Heidegger’s (1972, 2010) theory of time.   
 For Heidegger, time is the unfolding of being. Time occurs as the past 
directs the present toward the future. If a document constitutes the conceptual 
fusion of person and object, then it also constitutes the melding of the past, present 
and future of both the person and the object. These temporalities intersect at the 
present—the moment of the transaction, which is the moment of the document. This 
understanding of documental time is represented in the figure below. Visually, it 
echoes the convergence of the person’s and object’s lifeworlds illustrated by Wood 




A document, then, arises from the past of the person and the object, it manifests in 
their shared present, and it directs the future of both.  
 A human is composed of ancient molecules, including a set of organisms 
upon which the human is co-dependent, which are constantly being exchanged with 
molecules from the environment (Meadow, Altrichter, Bateman, Stenson, Brown, 
Green, & Bohannan, 2015). In a very real sense, then, a person is their environment, 
and the environment is the person. This worldliness is inextricable from 
humanness; it is a person’s most primordial past, and it colors their evolving past 
as they grow. Memories, for instance, are embedded with the environment that bore 
them. In the same way, an object’s environmental embeddedness is a characteristic 
of its primordial past. By virtue of being an object, it always already has a 
relationship with other objects. Objects, indeed, are composed of objects. 
Worldliness directs the future in that the future must also be worldly. A human 
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makes plans and imagines possibilities, and an object also has a worldly future: It 
may be blown away, disassembled or destroyed. It may erode and fade, or become 
humid or brittle. And insofar as human and object intersect—in present, documental 
moments—an object may change hands, be altered and interpreted, become the 
subject of stories, make an impression upon a person, constitute a marriage or 
graduation, and any number of other futurepresentpast possibilities.  
 Again prescient, Szymborska (2015, p. 162) observed: 
 
We read the letters of the dead like helpless gods, 
but gods nonetheless, since we know the dates that follow. 
 
A reader, in the present, apprehends a letter, affording a document. The reader has 
memories of a long-gone loved one: the writer. The writer’s past, present and future 
(from the reader’s perspective, all past) are infused in the past of the letter. As the 
reader engages with the letter in their present, they grapple with the possibilities 
and impossibilities of the future, given the past and present. The result in this case: 
helplessness in the face of death. But that helplessness emerges only at first—by 





This unfurling, as it were, of documents and time reveals one last frontier to be 
explored before its conclusion. Certain kinds of documents (engaging with the 
letters of the dead, perhaps) engender the sublime: numinous experiences (Latham, 
2014). Such encounters have been described as “unified experiences” (Wood & 
Latham, 2014, p. 95), wherein the past, present and future of both the person and 
object commingle to an extraordinary degree. Such experiences may also transcend 
space as well (Latham, 2014). These experiences are awe-inspiring, deeply personal 
and often connected with reverence, spirituality and a feeling of transportation. 
 Such singular experiences beg an addendum to my conceptualization of 
documental time. The theories of time outlined above all sought to characterize 
time in general—as it is in its “average everydayness,” as Heidegger (2010, p. 16) 
would say. But it would seem that in such powerful moments as numinous 
experiences, time may be experienced differently.  
 Indeed, another theory of time has been put forward which relates to time 
as experienced in the particular mental state of Buddhist enlightenment. As a 
spiritual experience, enlightenment defies intellectual description, but it has been 
described as the attainment of absolute emptiness and unity, which entails the 
fundamental loss of self. In the view of Dōgen, a Zen monk who lived in thirteenth-
century Japan, enlightenment also constitutes a rupture in the experience of time, 
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which is characterized by radical impermanence (Michelazzo, 2011). Along with 
the sense of self, all notions of duality disappear—including temporal distinctions 
such as permanent–impermanent, continuous–discontinuous and past–present–
future (Michelazzo). In other words, Dōgen, like Heidegger, describes the 
unification of past, present and future. But whereas Heidegger’s time is future-
oriented, Dōgen’s is present-total. In Dōgen’s words: “Life is absolutely life, death 
is absolutely death; spring is absolutely spring, summer is absolutely summer; each 
in itself is no more and no less—without the slightest possibility of becoming” 
(Abe, 1985, p. 64, as cited in Michelazzo, 2011, p. 81).  
 This numinous view of time, I argue, can be used to explore the temporality 
of numinous document experiences. Time in these experiences is fundamentally 
present-oriented. Though in all document experiences the past and future come to 
bear on the present, in numinous document experiences the boundaries between 
past, present and future are fully ruptured. This sheds further context on some of 
Latham’s (2014) findings, which exposed numinous document experiences as 





Time is wrapped up in, and wraps up, everything. Time is everything, and 
everything is time. Put more precisely, if opaquely: Everything times. My purpose 
here has been to shed a bit of light on the mechanism of time—enough, I hope, to 
demonstrate that time, particularly when it comes to documents, is not entirely 
inscrutable. 
 Still, I fear I have done nothing to temper the mystique of time. Actually, 
perhaps that is for the best. Indeed, I hope that I have exposed time in its average 
everydayness as a stupefying conundrum. For we often disparage the average and 
the everyday, and I would not want to rob them of their due. As it is, the average 
and the everyday receive scant admiration—we tend to be much more interested in 
those special moments we call experiences. But, as I’ve discovered, there is much 
wonder to be had in the world, even in a boring, gray afternoon of sifting through 
old notebooks. 
 As I opened with some of my own writing from a trip to Wales, it seems 
fitting to close with the writing of my favorite Welsh poet, R. S. Thomas (1993, p. 
379), whose lyric virtuosity I could only imitate: 
 
Where are you? I 
shouted, growing old in 
the interval between here and now. 
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The “interval between here and now,” we are now prepared to see, contains both 
the past (shouted) and the future (growing old). Indeed, if this discussion has served 
to elucidate anything, it is only what the poets have been saying all along: There is 
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